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The Right to Housing in France: Still a Long Way to Go from
Intention to Implementation
CLAIRE LÉVY-VROELANT*
Cet article a pour objectif de mettre en lumière les conditions de mise en œuvre du
droit au logement en France. Si la loi adoptée en mars 2007 a ouvert la voie à un
droit opposable, qui permet désormais aux personnes de faire valoir ce droit devant
un tribunal, elle a aussi instauré de nouvelles inégalités devant le droit. En effet, les
conditions requises pour accéder à ce droit excluent les personnes qui ne disposent
pas d’un droit au séjour ou d’un titre de séjour en cours de validité, tandis que sa
mise en œuvre effective se heurte au manque de logements disponibles, tout
particulièrement en Ile-de-France, et à la concurrence entre prioritaires. Le terrible
incendie de l’hôtel meublé parisien dans lequel 24 personnes—pour la plupart
immigrées—ont trouvé la mort en avril 2005, montre que le dispositif d’hébergement
d’urgence a trouvé ses limites. Si le droit français impose la mise à l’abri de toute
personne en détresse, l’offre disponible, aussi bien en logement qu’en hébergement,
ne suffit pas à satisfaire les besoins. L’examen de la mise en place d’un droit au
logement pour tous révèle aussi de possibles conflits d’intérêt entre les différents
acteurs décisionnaires dans ce champ : l’État (représenté par le Préfet), les
collectivités territoriales, et les bailleurs sociaux. L’article envisage d’abord la
législation en vigueur concernant le droit au logement en revenant sur ses origines.
Ensuite, c’est le processus de sélection qui est analysé. L’article se conclut sur une
réflexion sur les conséquences sociales de la mise en œuvre d’un tel droit, et sur ce
que ses défaillances révèlent de l’état des protections dans la société d’après le
welfare.
The goal of this essay is to examine the implementation of housing rights in France.
Legislation adopted in March 2007 opened the possibility of an enforceable right,
which can be asserted before a court. However, it also created new inequalities
before the law. Indeed, the conditions required to access that right exclude people
who do not have permanent residence or a valid temporary resident permit. The
implementation of this right is also limited due to the lack of available housing,
especially at Ile-de-France, and to competition between people with priority
entitlements. The horrible fire at a furnished Parisian hotel in which 24 people—
mostly immigrants—died in April 2005 demonstrated that the emergency housing
system has its limits. While French law may impose obligations to shelter people in
distress, the amount of housing and shelter space is not sufficient to meet the needs in
this area. A review of the establishment of a housing right for all also demonstrated
possible conflicts of interest between various decision-makers: the state (represented
by the prefect), territorial authorities, and social housing authorities. This essay first
examines legislation regarding the right to housing and explores the origins of the
*
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right to housing. The selection process is then analyzed. The essay concludes with a
reflection on the social consequences of the implementation of the right to housing,
and on what failures in its implementation reveal regarding the state of social
protections offered by the post-welfare society.

IN NOVEMBER 2013, a trial opened in the core of Paris, eight years after the drama in April
of 2005 when twenty-four people, including eleven children, died in a hotel blaze. For eight
full days, inside one of the Palais de Justice’s biggest courtrooms, the families of the victims
heard the witnesses and arguments by the lawyers, testified to the facts, answered the
president of the court’s questions, and were listened to. The Paris Opéra hotel was one of the
“fifth category” (i.e., low standard), as are most of the furnished hotels (hôtels meublés) in
Paris where immigrants are accommodated as a temporary solution before they make their
way in the city.1 Because of existing asylum procedures, limited accommodation, and the
obligation to house families in the name of the “protection of childhood,” these temporary
hotels have become the default tool for public policies, leading to undesirable effects. Most
importantly, this has led to horrendous housing conditions (e.g., no ability to cook at home
and the obligation to move very frequently from one hotel to another) and has perpetuated the
link between undocumented migrants, housing deprivation, and homelessness. In Paris, the
situation is particularly dramatic. Data provided by the SAMU Social of Paris2 show that
between 1999 and 2011, the number of persons living in a family accommodated in hotels
has increased from 1,834 to 11,431 and the number of individuals accommodated has
decreased from 12,643 to 8,896; in a decade, the percentage of persons living in a family has
grown from 13% to 56%.3
Furnished hotels have been transformed, based on housing need, into temporary
“social hotels,” so called because of the public nature of the subsidies. Such establishments
are generally approved by police headquarters for a maximum of one hundred people,
depending on the number of rooms and facilities. In the case of Paris Opéra hotel, it was
authorized for sixty-two. During the fatal night of 15 April 2005, despite the fact that the
Paris Opéra hotel was controlled by the police office responsible for the security of
establishments open to the public, the lack of any other accessible housing solution meant
that the establishment was overcrowded: eighty-two people were living there, and seventyseven were present that night.
It is important to say that the victims who lost their lives in the fire were all foreignborn, “temporarily” placed in the hotel with very little hope of ever being properly housed.
They had left countries at war or in which their lives were threatened: Algeria, Ivory Coast,
and Sri Lanka. Most of them had neither a resident permit nor, consequently, a work permit.
Almost all of the victims had been in France for years. Their children were born in France,
but they were still without homes, forced to wander from hotel to hotel.
The trial ended with prison sentences. The hotel was a family business. The hotel
managers, a husband and wife, were sentenced to three years in prison. The night watchman,
their son, was sentenced to two years, and the son’s girlfriend (who started the fire with a
candle) was sentenced to three years imprisonment. But this sentencing has not put an end to
the terrible ordeal; they have filed an appeal and, while we make the last revision to this
1

Alain Faure & Claire Lévy-Vroelant, Une chambre en ville. Hôtels meublés et garnis à Paris, 1860-1990
(Paris: Grâne, Éditions Créaphis, 2007).
2
The SAMU social de Paris is a service set up by Paris City Council in 1993. It combines a mobile night-time
outreach unit with a homeless crisis hotline. (Since one has to dial 115 to reach someone, the SAMU social is
also called “the 115.”)
3
Erwan Le Méner, “Quel toit pour les familles à la rue? L’hébergement d’urgence en hôtel social,”
Métropolitiques (12 June 2013), online: <www.metropolitiques.eu>.
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paper, the trial continues.4 On the civil side, the victims’ families have not, for the moment,
received any compensation for the losses. But after the drama, the survivors have been
rehoused in social housing flats in Paris and, thanks to the commitment of rights associations,
have since the tragedy obtained the legal right to residence and consequently a proper home
and a work position.
Starting from the Paris Opéra hotel tragedy5 is a way to approach the issue of rights to
housing in its extreme and contradictory manifestations: after years of privation of rights, the
tragedy allowed the survivors to finally realize their right to stay and receive a proper house.
As many of the survivors express, however, the price paid for being properly housed and
benefiting from the right to stay has been tremendously high. And in the end—other than the
increased pressure on security issues in the hotels—the system that made possible such a
disaster remains untouched.6 It is precisely that system that this paper proposes to deconstruct
and analyze in order to capture the elements in the definition, and in the concrete
implementation of the current right to housing, that limit its effectiveness. By system, we
mean the constellation of individual and collective actors’ behaviours, laws, procedures, and
values that contribute to the creation of housing needs, housing rights, and concrete housing
solutions, taking into account effects produced by the diversity of local configurations. In this
context, it is important to mention that several recent important reports consider the
emergency shelter system in France to be in crisis.7 Now, eight years after an enforceable
right to housing was recognized in France, more than 55,000 priority applications are still not
rehoused.
Since it is not possible to consider the whole picture,8 we will focus on the ambitions,
features, meaning, results, and limits of one piece of housing legislation in France: the DALO
Act.9 I am concerned primarily with the inequalities in the application of this law, and with
the exclusions resulting from the limitations of the Law itself more generally: undocumented
immigrants suffer worse housing conditions because they are excluded from the possibility of
applying. In France, the obligation to provide emergency shelter for asylum seekers and
families with young children (regardless of immigration status) is created by the Code de
l’action sociale et de la famille L. 345-2, L.345-2-2, and L.345-2-3. The right to decent
4

The court has recently decided to examine the demands on the civil side while the appeal is pending.
As a sociologist with a background in history, I have been studying non-ordinary housing such as hotels
meublés, foyers, residences sociales, etc. for years. My introduction to the issues related to the hotel Paris Opéra
began with the analysis of the living conditions in Parisian hotels, and my commitment has developed further
with the opportunity to follow the trial and the activities of the Association of the Victims’ Families (AVIPO)
and to collect the life stories of the families.
6
Claire Lévy-Vroelant, “Le jugement de l’incendie de l’hôtel Paris Opéra laisse intactes les causes du mal,” Le
Monde (12 February 2014), online: <www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2014/02/12/le-jugement-de-l-incendie-de-lhotel-opera-laisse-intacts-les-causes-du-mal_4365061_3232.html>. See also Erwan Le Méner & Nicolas
Oppenchaim, “The Temporary Accommodation of Homeless Families in Ile-de-France: Between Social
Emergency and Immigration Management” (2012) 6:1 European Journal of Homelessness 83 [“Temporary
Accommodation”].
7
France, Assemblée nationale, Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, Treizième législature, “Rapport d’information
déposé par le comité d’évaluation et de contrôle des politiques publiques sur l’évaluation de la politique de
l’hébergement d’urgence,” n° 4221 (26 January 2012). See also Fondation Abbé Pierre pour le logement des
personnes défavorisées, “19ème rapport sur l’État du Mal-Logement en France 2015” (2015) Fondation Abbé
Pierre pour le logement des personnes défavorisées [“19ème rapport”] and Fondation Abbé Pierre pour le
logement des personnes défavorisées, “20ème rapport sur l’État du Mal-Logement en France 2015” (2015)
Fondation Abbé Pierre pour le logement des personnes défavorisées [“20ème rapport”].
8
The scientific literature (sociological, juridical, anthropological, and economic) on both the affordable housing
crisis and on housing rights is abundant. Some of this literature is quoted and referenced in this paper. There are
also good official reports. Concerning France, we have in mind in particular the series of annual reports of the
High Committee on Housing for the Disadvantaged (HCLPD), see online: <www.hclpd.gouv.fr/>.
9
Loi n 2007-290 du 5 mars 2007, JO, 6 March 2007 [DALO].

5
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housing under the DALO, however, as we will see, has restrictions based on immigration
status. In other words, the lack of enforceable housing rights is aggravated by the increasingly
tenuous recognition of refugees’ right to stay in French territory (and more broadly in Europe
for the non-European), and by the instability of status regarding the right to stay for
immigrants generally,10 which also means the impossibility of working in the legal labour
market. The lack of equality before the law is a matter of location, income, and origins, as
different analyses based on surveys and official reports clearly show.11
We propose first to go back in time in order to figure out the legislation regarding
housing rights in France. Doing so, we intend to provide definition, context, and explanation
of the legal issues surrounding the DALO Act in France. Second, we will examine the
“housing offer,” the selection process, who remains excluded, and why. Third, an analysis of
broader social consequences will be proposed, including a discussion of the “post-welfare”
society. By proposing the idea that French law continues to evolve based on a “post-welfare”
society, I do not mean to suggest that the general level of protection has become lower, but
rather that it has become more fragmented, with new lines of inequalities and exclusion. I
intend to focus on the social and political tensions resulting from the increase of rights
(although limited), on the one hand, and on the more and more problematic implementation
of these rights on the other. I propose to consider that an “enforceable” right supposes
personal capacities and skills to ensure recognition of this right; it contributes therefore to the
individualization of social relations, with consequences for inequalities as regards protection.

I. THE DALO ACT—BACKGROUND
Behind the Paris Opéra hotel drama and the terrible stories of housing deprivation12 lies a
longstanding paradox: countries that are among the richest (and where the right to housing is
a time-honoured legacy of the democratic/welfare regime) nevertheless worry about social
cohesion and have proved incapable of providing access to housing for all.13 In France, there
is a huge gap between, on the one hand, the general improvement of housing conditions (the
residence area per person enlarged from 22.7 m2 to 40.4 m2 in less than three decades14) and,
on the other hand, the persistence of homelessness and bad housing conditions fuelling
poverty and evictions (13,000 effective evictions in 2013, a number that has doubled in the
decade). Some argue that the number of vacant properties is as large as the number of

10

A draft law concerning the civil status of foreigners in France was introduced the 23 July 2014 in the Council
of Ministers. Associations concerned with the rights of immigrants and refugees believe that the proposed law
will substantially improve the integration of foreign-born people. See e.g. Analyse collective, Projet de loi
relatif au droit des étrangers en France (February 2015), online: <www.gisti.org/spip.php?article4888>.
11
See e.g. the report provided by the HALDE (The Equal Opportunities and Anti-discrimination Commission),
Accès au logement social: garantir l’égalité (January 2011), online: <www.defenseurdesdroits.fr/sites/
default/files/upload/promotion_de_%20legalite/acces-au-logement-social-garantir-l-egalite.pdf>.
12
See e.g. Daniel Terrolle & Henri P. Gaboriau, “La mort comme seule réinsertion” (2003) in Daniel Terrolle &
Henri P. Gaboriau, eds, Ethnologie des sans logis (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2003) 181; Julien Damon, La question
SDF. Critique d’une action publique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2012); and FEANSTA, European
Observatory on Homelessness, Extent and Profile of Homelessness in European Member States: A Statistical
Update (December 2014) [European Observatory].
13
At the same time, countries where the right to housing exists only “on paper” can provide different forms of
solidarity and social cohesion. Even if very relevant, in our view, this question will not be developed in this
paper
14
France, Centre d’analyse stratégique (CAS), L’évolution des prix du logement en France depuis 25 ans,
Report No 221 (April 2011).
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homeless and ask public authorities to proceed with the requisition of vacant properties15 as
the law permits.16 Others argue that a revision of the entire social housing allocation process
represents a more credible (and more conventional) alternative when combined with a deep
reform of the associative sector in charge of homelessness and rent control: the recent ALUR
Act aimed to go in that direction.17

A. CONCEPTUALIZING THE RIGHT TO HOUSING
Though the French Constitution does not mention the word “housing” or “accommodation,”
and especially does not refer to any obligation, the concept of a “right to housing” has been
present in the law since the Quilliot Act of 22 June 1982, which called housing a
“fundamental right,” and the Mermaz Act of 6 July 1989.18 The Besson Act of May 199019
was also an important step forward because it extended the category of the beneficiaries to
“those who have difficulty accessing and maintaining adequate housing” and created a new
framework involving the department level where the national government can implement the
law through contractual plans20 driven by local authorities, ideally in collaboration with
public and private landlords, state representatives, and NGOs.
At about the same time, the Constitutional Council set down a reference framework,
stating that housing for disadvantaged people was a response to a demand of “national
interest,”21 and defining the possibility for everyone to have decent housing as an objective of
constitutional value, based on the constitution of 27 October 1946.22 As criticism increased
about the weakness of leadership, the opacity of the housing allocation system, and the lack
of effectiveness of the right to housing, the claim for a “legal right” grew, as did the role of
the (national) High Committee on Housing for the Disadvantaged and of many activist
NGOs. The idea of the enforceability of legal rights to housing emerged in 2002 in a context
of growing concern with homelessness, “including the relevant enforcement measures.”23 The
High Committee, aware of the limits of the obligation of efforts (efforts achieved through
area-based policy and local partnerships), proposed from 2002 an obligation of result (result
achieved though the initiation of legal remedies to guarantee the right to housing).24 In
January 2004, Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin publicly referred to this solution and the
necessity of the enforceability of the right. In the period following, enforceability’s “political
15

Requisition is the action by which the administrative authority, in the name of the general interest, imposes
itself in order to transfer or make use of private property in exchange for compensation. This procedure,
organized by Orders of 21 October 1945 and 21 December 1958, and revised by several laws afterwards, is
politically sensitive and a matter of periodic debate. See e.g. François Béguin, “Aide aux sans-abri: ‘L'Etat ferait
mieux de réquisitionner ses propres bâtiments,’” Le Monde (29 October 2012), online: <www.lemonde.fr>.
16
Typhaine Cornacchiari, “Une plate-forme pour le droit au lodgement opposable,” ATD Quart Monde (15
October 2006), online: <www.atd-quartmonde.fr/Une-plate-forme-pour-le-droit-au.html>.
17
Loi n 2014-366 du 24 mars 2014, JO, 26 March 2014.
18
Loi n° 82-526 du 22 juin 1982, JO, 23 June 1982; and loi n° 89-462 du 6 juillet 1989, JO, 8 July 1989.
19
Loi n° 90-449 du 31 mai 1990, JO, 2 June 1990.
20
These plans are called PDALPD, “departmental action plans for the housing of disadvantaged persons” (plans
départementaux pour le logement des personnes défavorisées).
21
Constitutional Council No. 90-274 DC of 29 May 1990.
22
Constitutional Council No. 94-359-DC of 19 January 1995. See generally Jean-Philippe Brouant,
“Implementation of the Enforceable Right to Housing (DALO) Confronted by the French Regions” in Noemie
Houard, ed, Social Housing Across Europe (Paris: La Documentation Française, 2011) 278 [“Implementation”].
23
Paul Bouchet, member of the High Committee on Housing for the Disadvantaged, quoted in René Ballain &
Francine Benguigui, eds, Mettre en oeuvre le droit au logement. L'accès au logement: des évolutions en débat 1
(Paris: La Documentation Française, 2004) at 37.
24
Noémie Houard & Claire Lévy-Vroelant, “The (Enforceable) Right to Housing: A Paradoxical French
Passion” (2013) 13:2 International Journal of Housing Policy 202.
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entrepreneurs”25 promoted the Scottish model because it placed emphasis on the requirement
for communities to offer accommodation to any homeless person considered a priority and
“who had not intentionally placed themselves in that situation.” In Scotland, this process
began with the 2001 Housing Act, which imposed new duties on local authorities to provide
temporary accommodation for non-priority homeless households and new obligations on
Registered Social Landlords to give reasonable preference to homeless households. More
radical reforms were introduced in the 2003 Homelessness Act, culminating in the
commitment that virtually all homeless people in Scotland would be entitled to be housed by
2012. Such objectives were principally supported by the gradual abolition of “priority need”
criterion to end the traditional “discrimination” against single persons and childless couples.26
The High Committee met the Scottish Federation of Housing Associations (SFHA) in
the spring of 2005 and then, drawing on that experience, the High Committee outlined its
own roadmap. The result was a profound change in the balance of power, including the
appointment of a responsible community upon which an obligation to achieve a result would
rest. Consequently, while the central state would retain the duty to house, the power to
achieve its goals concretely lay primarily with the municipalities and social landlords over
whom the state had little control.
The idea was then proposed that one (or several in certain cases) COMED
(commission de mediation) should be established at the departmental level in order to receive
the applicant’s complaint and evaluate its legitimacy and eligibility. The commission would
then transmit its recommendations to the responsible authority, which would seek competent
operators to address the specific housing problem. Social landlords would commit themselves
to house priority households, and the 30% “prefect quota”27 would also be firmly mobilized
and not diverted for other purposes. If housing was not found within a certain period
(determined according to the urgency of the situation and the average waiting time28 for
housing in the area), the applicant could then appeal to a judge for a judgment against the
state.
The quasi “ready to use” Scottish model was also popular among advocacy groups
and charitable organizations. Started in 2003 by six organizations, the “Platform for the
Enforceable Right to Housing” expanded rapidly by the end of 2006, bringing together some
sixty humanitarian and charitable organizations and housing activists. It is important to note
that the Platform reinforced and made official a consensual interpretation of social exclusion
as an individual lack of access to fundamental rights, ignoring alternative conceptions of
social exclusion such as poverty, lack of capital, insufficient capabilities, and inequalities.
This legalist conception was also, in a way, based on the idea that housing provision was
sufficient in number, quality, and price to the level of need. It did not approach in detail the
local balance between supply and demand. The idea was also to review the role of the state.

25

John W Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (Boston: Little, Brown and Co, 1984). The term
“political entrepreneur” proposed by Kingdon refers to pivotal players who, in response to a given problem, try
to promote alternative public policy by investing their resources (time, energy, reputation, money, etc.) in
exchange for a benefit, whether objective or symbolic, that they anticipate.
26
Suzanne Fitzpatrick, Sarah Johnsen & Beth Watts, International Homelessness Policy Review: A Report to
Inform the Review of Homelessness Legislation in Wales (January 2012) at 3.
27
Thirty per cent of social housing units are “reserved” by law for the prefect, who is supposed to allocate them
to those most in need—actually mainly the DALO applicants recognized as priority by the COMED.
28
The average waiting time is officially established by department. It is, for instance, ten years in Paris for a
three-room flat and one year in a rural or less urbanized department like Allier, Corrèze, or Sarthe. An
“abnormal waiting time” means a waiting time longer than average. See “Droit au logement opposable:
repetition générale et deniers réglages,” online: <www.senat.fr/rap/r08-092/r08-0927.html>.
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Raising public awareness by disseminating numerous press communiqués,29 the Platform
focused on asserting the right to housing as a fundamental right, with the double demand of a
guarantee by the state and a strong right for individuals, enforceable in court. But despite the
efforts of the High Committee and the Platform for the Enforceable Right to Housing to build
a consensus, differences remained on three crucial points: the responsible political authority,
the schedule, and the housing stock involved.

B. A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY
Inspired, as mentioned, by the Scottish Homelessness Monitoring Group, the High
Committee suggested setting up a national monitoring committee and a national evaluation
team, including “pilot projects.” This important initiative opened the floor to the candidate
Nicolas Sarkozy to take up the issue in his presidential campaign from January 2007 with the
“Zero Homeless” slogan. However, the attention devoted to the issue of housing by all
presidential candidates remained confined to housing policy experts: it was not yet part of a
broader discussion in society. The Enfants de Don Quichotte’s30 action in winter of 2006–
2007 made the difference. Together with homeless persons and activists, they set up a camp
of about one hundred tents on the banks of the Canal Saint-Martin on January the 16th,
mediatizing homelessness from the very core of Paris and creating a “scandal” at the apogee
of the presidential election campaign. The idea of “enforceability” entered media debates, and
the association leader, Augustin Legrand, became a very popular figure. In May 2006, Prime
Minister Dominique de Villepin declared his interest in DALO and announced his decision to
allow pilot projects where local authorities volunteered. This process involved many actors
on a local basis, including state social services and social housing organizations. As for the
provision of necessary dwellings, it involved not only social housing stock, but private rental
housing as well. An agenda was set up according to the HCLPD report propositions.31
The enforceable right to housing was introduced by the DALO Act in 2007 as a new
procedure, stating that the right to housing would be exercised via mediation and then, where
applicable, via legal appeal.32 Prepared and adopted thanks to a consensus from right and left
political parties—even if a matter of debate regarding its efficiency and its philosophy—this
law introduced a rupture into the previous logic regarding the implementation of the right to
housing. By replacing the “obligation of means” with the “obligation of result,” the DALO
Act places the state as guarantor and makes the state responsible for its effectiveness.
Homeless persons or persons suffering poor housing conditions can access the COMED (one

29

See Initiatives Pour un Autre Monde (IPAM), Plate forme “pour un droit au logement opposable,” online:
IPAM <www.reseau-ipam.org/spip.php?rubrique246> and the webpage of the High Committee, online:
<www.hclpd.gouv.fr>.
30
“The Children of Don Quixote” was founded in 2006. The association aims to protest against homelessness
See online: <facebook.com/pages/Les-Enfants-de-Don-Quichotte/184794634957>.
31
HCLPD, “Rapport au Premier ministre sur l’expérimentation locale du droit au logement opposable” (October
2006) at 11.
32
“Implementation,” supra note 22 at 279. The DALO Act stipulates that:
The right to decent and independent housing, mentioned in article 1 of Act no. 90-449 (31 May 1990),
whose objective is the implementation of a right to housing, is guaranteed by the State to all people who
reside in the French territory on a regular basis and in conditions of permanence (defined by a decree of
the Council of State) and who are not able to access or maintain housing own their own.
This right is first exercised through mediation and, if necessary, through an adversarial process as
defined at article 1 and articles L. 441-2-3 and L. 441-2-3-1.
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per department33) as outlined earlier; if recognized as right-holders, those persons can go to
the court and ask for the enforcement of their right.
In this matter, it is important to refer to the French Housing and Building Code (or
CCH), which has implemented, since its creation, the legal changes of the DALO as they
impact concrete modalities in the field of construction and housing.34 The following
quotation aims to indicate precisely the delicate operation through which the legislator has
operationalized state responsibility by delegating it to local authorities (at the department
level), according to the DALO Act. The CCH establishes that:
At each Department, one or several mediation commissions are created through
the Department State representative. Each commission is chaired by a qualified
person nominated by the State representative.
According to the State Council decree, commissions are composed in equal parts
by:
1. state representatives;
2. representative of the Department, public organizations for intercommunal
cooperation, and municipalities;
3. representatives of social housing bodies and of organizations managing
housing structures, temporary housing facilities, shelters or social hotel
residences, who are active in the Department;
4. representatives of tenants’ associations and of associations and organizations
active in the field of social integration or housing of marginalized persons,
working in the Department.
A representative of the legal entity managing the Department’s integrated intake
and orientation services can assist the commission on an advisory basis.35
Regarding the conditions to apply, priorities are established. The CCH states that:
A mediation commission can be accessed by any person who satisfies the
statutory conditions for access social housing and who has not received any
adapted offer following his/her housing application within the statutory time limit
(CCH article L.441-1-4). A commission can be accessed without delay when the
applicant is in good faith, has no home, or is threatened with eviction without
relocation options, or is housed or accommodated temporarily in an institution,
shelter or social residence hotel, or is housed in places unfit for living, unhealthy
or dangerous. A commission can also be accessed without delay when the
applicant is housed in an obviously overcrowded or indecent place, when there is
at least one minor child or one dependent person living with a disability involved,
as defined by s. L.114 of the Code de l’action sociale et des familles (Social
Action and Family Code), or if he/she lives with a disability, as defined under the
same code.36
33

Departments are the smallest administrative entity and local authority in charge of, among other things, social
benefits. Departments were introduced by the legislator during the French revolution (1790). France has 101
departments, which compose 22 regions. Paris (Ile-de-France), Lyon (Rhône-Alpes) and Marseille (ProvenceAlpes-Côte d’Azur) regions are the most populous ones.
34
Code de la construction et de l'habitation [CCH].
35
Ibid art L441-2-3.
36
Ibid.
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From these quotations, it is understandable that this right is a quite extensive one, but also
that it is conditional. It is also clear that this quite complex system introduces a competition
between potential right holders, and that it is strictly dependent on the availability of housing
stock.
A gradual implementation was decided upon: a right to housing should be recognized
for anyone in an emergency situation by the end of 2008, made enforceable for families with
children by May 2012, and then further extended to all in March 201437—with the restriction
that applicants need either to have French nationality or a valid regular residence permit.
Some argue that, rather than a real step toward effective rights, a version of a “poor right for
the poor” has been invented; rather than a real path to effective rights, it has been, at least in
the more tense territories (like Paris, Lyon, and Marseille regions) a vague, politically limited
agenda established under pressure from the streets and in accordance with a widespread
preoccupation in the public opinion. But if the DALO theoretically enables jurisdictions to
enforce the right to housing, the final decision concretely belongs to the local stakeholders. In
this matter, underlying one of the main issues a report has been requested by the minister in
charge of housing,38 in order to clarify the obstacles that discourage the prefects to use their
quota (30%) which has been expressly reinsured.39

II. THE PATH TO EFFECTIVE RIGHTS
A. SOCIAL AND “VERY SOCIAL” HOUSING: ALLOCATION
PRACTICES
Housing is allocated in one of three ways. The ordinary procedure for social housing
allocation is complex and gives way to different treatments in the territories. It involves
basically six steps, starting from the application and ending when the demand arrives at the
allocation committee. Besides this common procedure, as defined by CCH article L.441-1,
separate allocation channels (filières d’attribution) have been designed to meet the needs of
persons potentially eligible for social housing under conditions defined in the Besson Act (31
May 1990). These channels are implemented under “departmental action plans for the
housing of disadvantaged persons” (PDALPD). There is also, finally, a third “new channel”
resulting from the treatment of the DALO appeal. The prefect quota (30%) applies mainly to
the latter channel, but it is to be noted that its fulfillment is not easy. On a legal level, the
prefect can impose an applicant on a recalcitrant social housing body, but in doing so may
face open conflict with the enterprise and may be forced to bear the costs of this heavy and
complex procedure.
Who should get priority social housing is a key question. In France, as in many
countries in Europe with a longstanding welfare state,40 social housing was built to address
the perceived housing-market failure to deliver sufficient affordable housing to a useful and
deserving working class. Social housing was also built to enable slum clearance and end the
use of shantytowns. Since the DALO Act, social housing has become more closely associated
with policies aimed to tackle homelessness. At the same time, the economic crisis has made
37

Houard, supra note 24.
France, Conseil Général de l’environnement et du développement durable, Les contingents de logements
locatifs sociaux réservés par l'État, by Jean Chapelon, Thanh-Nhuan Nguyen & Patricia Perrin, Report No
008145-01 (November 2012) at 5.
39
CCH, supra note 34 art R*441-5.
40
Claire Lévy-Vroelant, “Temporary Housing” in Susan Smith, ed, The International Encyclopaedia of Housing
and Home” (Oxford: Elsevier, 2012) 172 [“Temporary Housing”].
38
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social housing the only option for a larger part of the population. Social housing, however,
only partly meets the housing needs of homeless people, even in areas where the housing
supply is sufficient or exceeds demand. There are several reasons for this. First, social
housing allocation practices often reflect a concern about negative effects associated with
spatial concentrations of poverty that housing homeless people at high rates could create.
Second, social housing providers may be reluctant to house tenants they perceive as
presenting “management problems.” Third, the level of openness or restrictiveness that social
housing presents vis-à-vis homeless people is related to the social housing movement’s
history. In France, it is clear that its perceived function, from inside as well as from outside,
and since the beginning, has been to provide adequate affordable housing to wage workers
and their families more than to the poorest.41 Social housing may then not always be very
open to some groups of homeless people (or other groups) for “cultural” and historical
reasons.
The HALDE42 reports from the last available INSEE43 housing survey (2006) found
that immigrant households, as defined by the national statistical system,44 receive less
favourable treatment regarding access to housing. Immigrants are often considered by social
landlords to be tenants both “at risk” and potentially the cause of problems. This prejudice is
quite widespread so that immigrants receive housing of lower quality both in terms of the
type of housing offered and the location. Immigrants also experience longer waiting times to
get an offer for housing. They are more numerous in the oldest and less well maintained parts
of the stock, and they are given less opportunity to relocate. These specific manifestations of
discrimination thus lead the High Council on Integration to report a “gentle but systemic
discrimination” in the social housing sector:
This inequality of treatment appears to mainly be the result of a collective and
progressive construct of practices leading to reproducing inequalities, a process
that is more or less controlled, conscious or acknowledged. There are often
revealed a posteriori, by statistical comparison between the demands and the
effective allocation among different groups of applicants, according to their
characteristics. The European Committee of Social Rights notes that, since 2004,
statistics show longer delays for immigrant applicants than for others. It thus
suggests the existence of a problem of indirect discrimination against immigrants
in access to social housing.45
Although it is quite well developed and has been modified by successive orders, the legal
framework for social housing allocation, as defined in the CCH, allows a lot of flexibility to
social landlords and reserving agencies (organismes réservataires) with regard to the
allocation of social dwellings:

41

Claire Lévy-Vroelant & Christoph Reinprecht, “Housing the Poor in Paris and Vienna” in Kathleen Scanlon
Christine Whitehead & Melissa Fernández Arrigoitia, eds, Social Housing in Europe (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell,
2014) 297 [“Paris and Vienna”].
42
The French Equal Opportunities and Anti-discrimination Commission (Haute autorité de lutte contre les
discriminations et pour l’égalité).
43
National Institute for Statistics and Economical Studies, the French official statistical agency.
44
In the French context, “immigrant” is an official statistical category that includes foreigners having settled in
France and having secured a right of residence (or has been granted French citizenship). In a broader sense, the
term “immigrant” is used, statistically speaking, to designate anyone having migrated to France with the
intention of staying, independent of his or her legal status.
45
HALDE, supra note 11 at 17.
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This flexibility provides an opportunity for stakeholders to apply general rules in
a way that is adapted to different local contexts. However, considering the
ambiguity or vagueness of legal texts, stakeholders can also put in place practices
that, in fact, give rise to unequal treatment and even discrimination.46
Barriers that exist to social housing are based on what homeless people are perceived to be
like, that is, characterized by severe mental illness and problematic drug and alcohol use
rather than what the reality of much homelessness actually is: people in poverty who have
lost housing. That the street leads to mental health and addiction concerns is something quite
different.47
In a context where the working classes have become more fragmented and vulnerable
(in a more acute way since the end of the nineties), traditional welfare-based options have
been replaced: social programs now aim to link “insertion” (entry or re-entry into the labour
market) to housing—often under the leitmotif “housing is not enough.” This option, which is
also observable in other countries in Europe, is powered by a variety of associations and civic
organizations belonging to a vast and re-emerging third sector. “Very social” providers and
their staff not only deliver “new housing products” to those “in need,” but they are also
supposed to introduce applicants to the norms of employment and encourage them to be more
responsible. In France, there is a range of “very social” housing options, from emergency
shelters to hotels and social residences. In fact, DALO includes, besides housing, a shelter
dimension: in certain cases, applicants can be given temporary accommodation.
It is also certainly worth noting that non-profit organizations increasingly contribute
to public action, specifically in the field of housing. Between activism (fight for the rights)
and social work (accompanying and support), this “street-level bureaucracy”48 conducts dayto-day work in the field of access to justice for disadvantaged people, playing an ambiguous
policy-making role. By favouring access to the enforceable right to housing, non-profits
certainly contribute to empower individuals, but in doing so they also exercise discretionary
power in the selection process and in the reinforcement of mainstream requirements and
values. In other words, the DALO procedure functions thanks to street-level bureaucratic
agents who enable the system to carry on and engage in a selection process at an early
stage—before the mediation commission.49 Indirect or even unintentional discrimination
based on place of origin and the lack of diverse types of capital (social, financial,
professional, linguistic, etc.) is also operating as a filter in this context, limiting the number of
applicants and, at the same time, efficiently supporting a select group.

B. THE “OBLIGATION OF RESULT” FROM THE STATE AND THE
MEANS MOBILIZED
46

Ibid at 14.
See Anne Laporte, Erwan Le Méner & Pierre Chauvin, “La santé mentale et les addictions des personnes sans
logement personnel en Île-de-France” (2010) 5 La Lettre, online: Observatoire National de la Pauvreté et de
l’Exclusion Sociale <http://www.onpes.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/05LETTRE.pdf>. This discusses a SAMENTA survey
conducted in 2009 by the SAMU Social Observatory with a random sample of people without housing in Ile-deFrance. It addresses the prevalence of psychiatric disorders and addictions. Among the 21,176 French people
without personal housing, nearly a third present with a very incapacitating, severe psychiatric disorder
(psychosis, depression, or anxiety). A similar proportion has a dependency on, or regular consumption of,
psychoactive substances. There are relatively fewer instances of alcoholism than found in the general
population.
48
Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services (New York: Russel
Sage Foundation, 1980).
49
Pierre-Édouard Weill, “Quand les associations font office de street-level bureaucracy” (2014) 56:3 Sociologie
du travail 298.
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Because the DALO Act establishes an “obligation of result” on the state, there are obligations
of means or obligations to achieve results on local authorities. The Constitutional Council
judged, for instance, that the obligation for some municipalities to comply with a minimum
quota of 20% of social housing on their territory, as set down by the Urban Renewal and
Solidarity Act of 13 December 2000, did not breach the principle of free administration of
local authorities (decision No.2000-436-DC of 7 December 2000).50 Nevertheless, this
objective has been achieved only in places where local authorities have made sound political
choices. In Paris, the new mayor, Anne Hidalgo, recently established that the level of social
housing to be implemented will be up to 30% of the whole Parisian housing stock, while
other municipalities are well under the required 20%. Again, the main point here is that the
different forms of accommodation to be mobilized for the DALO implementation, and the
whole allocation process, are under the control of local stakeholders. As mentioned above,
they are classified into two types: proper housing and shelter. Each of the two main types
includes many different sub-types according to the status of the property (private or public),
the type of funding, the specialization (in terms of tenants or resident or sheltered persons),
the official duration of the stay, the support services, and so on. “Generalist sheltering
structures” amount to around 86,000 places, “specialized sheltering structures” amount to
around 32,000 (for a total of more than 100,000 places51), and collective homes (logementsfoyers) accommodate around 153,000 persons.52 Hotels such as hotel Paris Opéra
accommodate around 38,000 persons.53
Ambiguities of social housing enterprise missions in the three last decades are wellknown: The CCH reminds us that the construction, allocation, and management of rented
social housing will “play a role in implementing the right to housing and contribute to the
necessary social mix of towns and neighbourhoods.”54 In addition, the DALO procedure itself
provides for the consideration of this objective, as the prefect must define the scope of
housing allocation “taking into account the objectives of social mix defined by the intercommunal or departmental collective agreement.”55 Analyses provided by non-French
observers usefully underline the contradiction lying at the very core of the social housing
sector; that is to say, the tension in the mission of French social housing providers: social
housing is expected to implement the right to housing, on the one hand, and to facilitate
social mixing and territorial equity on the other.56 At that point, a second contradiction has to
be noted: in the implementation of the enforceable right to housing (droit opposable),57 while
the state has the role of a “leader” and could impose a certain number of obligations of means
50

“Implementation,” supra note 22.
These numbers exclude collective accommodation for elderly people. Being ruled by hundreds of
organizations, their number varies according to the source. See e.g. Emmanuel Pliquet, “Plus de 100.000 places
d’hébergement pour les personnes en difficulté sociale” (2015) 916 Études et résultats, online: DREES
<www.drees.sante. gouv.fr>.
52
See HCLPD, Du foyer de travailleurs migrants à la résidence sociale: mener à bien la mutation—16ème
rapport du Haut Comité pour le logement des personnes défavorisées (July 2010), online:
<www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/104000473/index.shtml>.
53
“20ème rapport,” supra note 7 at 289.
54
CCH, supra note 34 art L411.
55
“Implementation,” supra note 22 at 285; CCH, supra note 34 art L411-2-3.
56
Jane Ball, “Property, Altruism and Welfare: What Social Housing Allocation Tells Us about English and
French Legal Differences” in Kathleen Scanlon, Christine Whitehead & Melissa Fernández Arrigoitia, eds,
Social Housing in Europe (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2014) 349.
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There is an issue concerning the translation of the “droit au logement opposable.” It is important to say that
the phrase “enforceable right” (droit opposable) should not imply that a claim, if made, would be successful.
Nevertheless, we will use “enforceable right” in this text because it is most commonly used in specialized
literature.
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or obligations to achieve results on local authorities, namely through the prefect quota, the
principle of free administration by local authorities remains preponderant. In other words,
“the qualification of ‘national interest’ did not result in a State monopoly in the field of
housing.”58
Funded by social budgets and operated through private-public partnerships, the
housing supply (in terms of accommodation) is also diverse in terms of the methods used to
access a place to stay. The whole sector of temporary accommodation59 should be considered
hybrid: whatever their legal forms are, the owners are individuals or private companies
benefiting from public funding in order to offer affordable housing or shelter solutions. The
hybridity is also present in the standards: furnished rooms like those of the Paris Opéra hotel
are included in the sector, as well as social residences which offer much better living
conditions, and foyers where standards in terms of comfort, space, and services are very
diverse. Social housing is active in the sector, the general model being limited-profit
companies benefitting from favourable loans as social constructors60 and different types of
specific social subsidies provided at national, regional, and departmental levels as they are
considered to support public service action. Finally, hybridity is also created by resorting to
the ordinary private sector thanks to specific allowances or tax incentives to the landlords:
this stock is unfortunately very difficult to measure.
Considering the means that can be mobilized in terms of housing for those who have
no home, we have to come back to the evidence that housing deprivation is not a
characteristic of a person, but is instead a process that depends both on personal (familial)
resources and on the housing that can be mobilized. The DALO Act is supposed to facilitate
putting supply in front of a demand. However, the situation is totally different from one
department to another. Though there are no tensions in other parts of the country, in the Paris
region (IDF), as mentioned, the competition for housing is severe, and the number of stillnot-rehoused priority households is increasing, with the “stock” of applicants being currently
equivalent to the usual number of applicants in three years (surpassing 41,000 persons). The
average number of applicants is 140 per 100,000 in France as a whole, and 6 times more—
709 per 100,000 inhabitants—in Seine-St-Denis (a less-wealthy department in the Paris
region). The departmental level is, in France, the one where the homeless and more generally
DALO applicants must apply and from which a “housing solution” is supposed to be offered.
It is thus within the constellation of actors who play at this level—social landlords, charities,
social services, departmental services in charge of housing vulnerable groups according to the
PDALPD,61 and local authorities—that the “solution” must be found. But if the picture is
quite different from one region to another, we find generally that housing provision
corresponding to the demand (that is to say, affordable) appears to be insufficient, be it “very
social,” “social,” or “private.” Furthermore, the staircase model, in which one moves through
a variety of successive accommodations, has been seriously challenged. The “homeless
carrier”62 from the street to shelter, from shelter to temporary accommodation, and from
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“Implementation,” supra note 22 at 279.
“Temporary Housing,” supra note 40.
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Delivered by the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations, a historical institution which serves as a deposit bank
for public housing funding.
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These plans (see note 20) were introduced by the Besson Act of 31 May 1990, which was supposed to monitor
the whole housing allocation system. Since then, other services have been created, and the whole system is often
criticized for its confusion.
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temporary accommodation to housing is no longer a massive reality, at least for the more
vulnerable—if it ever was.63

C. FROM THE STAIRCASE MODEL TO THE HOUSING FIRST
PARADIGM
After two decades of active promotion of the “staircase paradigm,”64 French housing and
social policies have recently decided to conduct “housing first” pilot projects.65 The current
situation is quite blurred. On the one hand, by betting on the insertion paradigm and the
homeless carrier due to a reliance on the staircase paradigm, a large number of transitory
accommodations have been constructed or renewed;66 on the other hand, much of this
transitory accommodation has resulted in a dead-end for those placed there by social services,
which has renewed interest in the “housing first” model as a possible alternative. The
challenge there lies in how social housing providers can work together with housing support
services, social care services, health services, and other forms of support to enable housing to
be successful according to the model that arrived from the other side of the Atlantic.67
The prevalence of mental health problems among homeless persons has been
demonstrated in the Paris region.68 The evidence that the “housing first” service model could
enable chronically homeless people to enter and maintain themselves in an ordinary house,
with the right floating support services in place, has been tested through an experiment
initiated in 2010 in Lille, Marseille, Toulouse, and Paris. In each site, the experience includes
100 housing units proposed for three years under rolling leases (the lease is first in the name
of the association and then it “rolls” to the tenant) to persons with strong addictions, mental
health problems, or those just liberated from prison. In Paris, the organism in charge is
“Aurore” in partnership with the Maison Blanche Public Institution of mental health, and
other private or public structures.69 The program certainly corresponds to the needs of the
63

In Le Monde 29 November 2007, Daniel Terrolle was quoted as saying: “J’ai acquis la conviction que les
SDF, en grande majorité, ne se réinsèrent pas,” which translates to, “It has become my conviction that the larger
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Ingrid Salhin, “The Staircase of Transition: Survival through Failure” (Paper delivered at the ICCR seminar
on Housing and Social Inclusion, Brussels, 16–17 January 2003); See also “Temporary Housing,” supra note
40.
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“Housing First” is a concept developed by Dr. Sam Tsemberis in 1992. See Pathways to Housing National,
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67
Sam Tsemberis, “Housing First: Ending Homelessness, Promoting Recovery and Reducing Costs” in Ingrid
G. Ellen & Brendan O’Flaherty, eds, How to House the Homeless (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2010)
37.
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Laporte, supra note 47.
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psychiques, online: <www.vih.org/20131016/housing-first-nouvelles-reponses-pour-usagers-souffrant-troublespsychiques-37525>.
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targeted persons, and seems to have very good results in terms of stabilization. But will those
responsible decide to generalize the model and pay for it? At the moment, this remains a
limited experiment, having more to do with medical expectations (treating and alleviating
suffering) than social ones (reinserting and integrating the persons).

D. DALO, SEVEN YEARS LATER
Since its adoption, as mentioned, the DALO Act has received mixed reactions. If some are
decidedly optimistic, arguing that a legalized right is always a step toward more justice,
others assert that this right is nothing but an additional state program for accessing housing
and not the consecration of a right to housing.70
To draw a more comprehensive picture: despite quite clear legislation, despite
changes in governance intended to promote social cohesion, and despite an emergency
program for social rental housing (150,000 social housing units expected to be built annually,
and the role of charities and associations in charge of accommodation and shelters to be
increased), there are about 700,000 people without a personal residence71 (homeless, with or
without shelter) and five million people in difficult, uncomfortable, or vulnerable housing:
this amounts to almost 8% of the population of France.72 More precisely, 3,657,000 persons
are considered “very vulnerable” (i.e., around 6% of the whole population). Among them, a
first category (685,000) includes the most vulnerable, people without their own home,
including the homeless (141,000), people temporarily housed in hotels, hostels, makeshift
shelters, etc. and people accommodated by another household (411,000). A second, larger
category (2,778,000 persons) includes individuals living in substandard or overcrowded
housing, and those with precarious occupancy status. In addition, around 500,000 people live
in households with rent arrears. Altogether, the Abbé Pierre Foundation found that almost 10
million people living in France are impacted by the “housing crisis” in one way or another.
This phenomenon is not decreasing, but is instead increasing. Here two crucial elements have
to be noted. First, the national homelessness surveys conducted in 2001 and 2012 show that
the number of homeless has increased 50% between 2001 and 2011, from 104,000 in 2001 to
141,000 in 2012.73 Second, analyses now see a continuum between situations of
homelessness and situations of housing deprivation, as is advocated in a 2011 INSEE
publication. This publication’s title is emblematic of the growth of the phenomenon and of its
perception: “Being homeless, experiencing difficult housing conditions.”74 Housing
deprivation is multifaceted, and has become structural despite the DALO.
Actually, it was partly to reverse this trend that the DALO Act established an
enforceable right to housing and referred to the state as a guarantor of that right. But the
number who would qualify to re-house remains higher than the number who have actually
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found accommodation, and the French state was fined 12.9 million EUR in 2012—by its own
courts75—for its failure to address right-holders’ needs.
The total number of applications received under the DALO Act between its gradual
implementation in 2008 and 2013 reached 463,091.76 The monitoring committee has
publically declared that the situation is of great concern, especially in the Paris region (Ile-deFrance), with more than 41,375 priority households (up from 36,905 a year ago) still not
rehoused. In 2013, 91,091 appeals were lodged, including 52,799 in IDF (58%) and 11,853
(13%) in Paris alone. The national emergency pool set up to ensure that the implementation
of the DALO Act had all the necessary tools and means that were planned (e.g., prefectreserved quotas of social housing units, fair prioritization, and so on) has turned out to be
insufficient, or at least insufficiently implemented. In 2013, appeals increased monthly by
7,591 on average; about 54% were rejected. Of the total remaining appeals—that is, of those
that were accepted—a large part (42%) have not been appropriately accommodated, and most
of them (42,408 out of 54,394) have already surpassed the “normal waiting time.”77
The priority criteria applied in 2013 were as follows: 26% of applicants were
homeless or sheltered at someone else’s house, 10% were under eviction threat without the
possibility of re-housing, 7% were in the shelter system, 7% came from a temporary housing
(sheltering centers, collective homes, or a furnished room in a hotel), 4% lived in places unfit
for human habitation (including dangerous places), around 20% lived in an unhealthy
building or overcrowded place together with an handicapped person, and 27% were on the
waiting list for housing for an “abnormally long delay.” Looking at the nationality of the
applicants, we see that 61% were French, 3% European-community citizens, 33% were from
other continents (twice the national rate). In terms of income, 11% earned between 0 € and
0.5 SMIC,78 30% between 0.5 SMIC and 1 SMIC, 24% between 1 and 1.5 SMIC, and 22%
earned more than 1.5 SMIC. These data are difficult to analyze because they are not related to
the size and composition of the households, but they show the poverty of the majority of the
applicants, and also the percentage of those with low-medium income but no decent home.
We know that 34% of the applications are from single parent households, 32% from single
persons, and 27% from families including children.79
It is also interesting to track changes in the decision-making and effectiveness of the
process itself. In 2013, 36% of applicants received a favourable answer (i.e., they were
recognized as priority),80 but the favourable decision rate is decreasing. The most striking
result is the final re-housing effectiveness (including those who have found a solution by
themselves): the rate was 86% in 2008, but it is now only 58.6%. In other words, only 27% of
the applicants are finally re-housed if rejections and refusals are taken into account. On the
applicants’ side, a significant number refuse the proposals they are offered (around 20%),
seriously challenging the management of the allocation system. Location and cost of rent
appear to be the two main issues for refusal. The current allocation system is strongly
supported by social landlords of all types, but it is difficult not to be aware of the limits of the
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bureaucratic functioning. There are two reasons for that: first, in the current allocation
process, it is always the available supply that determines the allocation and not the need to
generate the response in terms of housing allocation. Second, individuals have their own
rationales and motivations, and ignorance or misunderstanding of them can lead to confusion
and disillusionment.
Resulting from a complex and quite long-standing policy development path, with
many players involved at different levels of the policy system,81 the enacted enforceable right
to housing at first raised much hope but has since been viewed as quite inefficient. Is the
enforceable right to housing 2007 act just an additional device for social assistance, or is it a
new way of implementing social justice? It has simultaneously aroused great hopes and
caused great disappointment and frustration;82 seven years after its enactment, one can only
report mixed results.83

III. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES: TOWARD
A “POST-WELFARE” SOCIETY?
A. THE CHANGING PARADIGM OF SOCIAL INTERVENTION
The obstacles arising out of the DALO experience must be interpreted from a broader
perspective. In other words, it is important to contextualize the results. The paradigm of
social intervention has changed from one where the state takes a decisive role to one where
new actors emerging from civil society to fulfill a mission of public service, using new moral
and political principles as well as new tools, also play an important role.84 The number of
interventions in favour of the poor is far from declining, yet actual housing supply remains
insufficient considering the demand. The number of DALO re-housed applicants might cause
us to see the half-empty side of the glass rather than the half-full one. How is that possible? Is
the judicial framework faulty? Should the governance be questioned? Is the whole system
weakened by a general housing shortage?
We should start by eliminating the last proposition (even if the topic is very much
discussed in France at the moment). France as a whole has a comfortable ratio of housing
units to inhabitant (510/1000) and one of the highest proportions of social housing in Europe
(17%)—with the dramatic exception of main urban areas, the Paris region most of all. Far
from concerning exclusively the new construction issue, the main stake could be to slow
down the rent increases, to achieve energy upgrades and heating renovations for the older
part of the housing stock, to improve the living environment in order to make
neighbourhoods more attractive (especially in under-served communities) and, obviously, to
activate residential mobility: access to existing stock is extremely important when compared
with the creation of a new stock by low-rent housing units construction. Access to existing
stock is crucial considering that 2,700,000 dwellings are vacated every year, including
400,000 social housing units. The impact of residential mobility is much larger than housing
construction: an increase in residential mobility releases tensions and potentially moderates
prices—if rents are under control. Obviously, this preference for mobility is correct only at
81
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the national level. Local shortages can be extremely challenging, as they are in Ile-de-France,
but even there the issue is about affordability and social exclusion.
With regard to the issue of judicial framework, as we’ve discussed, housing rights are
already established in law as an objective of constitutional value. However, this right is
effectively limited: “the right to housing being recognized as an objective of constitutional
value is not sufficient to raise it to the level of a ‘fundamental freedom’ under the terms of
Article 521-2 of the French Code of Administrative Justice, or as a ‘constitutional principle’:
CE, ord. 3 May 2002, no. 245697.”85 It is also not, we might add, sufficient for the persons
recognized as priority by the departmental COMED and seeking justice. In other words, it
may be possible to penalize the state when it fails to provide housing, but it is not possible to
obtain the ends of that right (i.e., housing) for all qualified applicants.
The conception of rights defended by the law is not universal but is instead based on a
historical understanding of national government sovereignty: there are still conditions that
must be satisfied to access a DALO application (beyond the conditions established by each
commission). These conditions also explain the rejection of half the applicants on average. In
addition to the inability to house oneself, for example, one must also be eligible for social
housing (income conditions), and must be either a French citizen or hold a valid residence
permit. The right to decent and independent housing’s state guarantee is offered to any person
who meets the following three cumulative conditions:
1. be of French nationality or have a valid regular residence permit,
2. be unable to obtain or retain decent and independent housing by one’s own
means,
3. meet the statutory conditions for accessing social housing.86
The first condition has become, for many, an insurmountable challenge because of the
growing uncertainty regarding the delivery of the first and subsequent renewals of residence
permits combined with restrictive asylum and immigration policies. This is a lesson to be
drawn also from the Paris Opéra hotel drama. Homelessness has gained another meaning in
the context of European (unequal and restrictive) immigration policies, and thus
homelessness, in a sense, has become a European concern. The intersections between
immigration policies and homelessness are increasingly pronounced within the European
context. The huge tension between migration restrictions, housing rights, and development
policies toward the countries of origin seems to lead, in the current juncture, to international
competition and protectionism to the detriment of negotiated and socially responsible
solutions.87
At the same time, this right to be housed is still one of “constitutional value.”
Powerful civil-society groups supporting a constitutionally protected right to housing have
been supported by high-ranking officials close to the state, and so the contradiction between
the rights (locally interpretable) and the Law (non-negotiable) has been laid bare. But be it
more “human” or more “bureaucratic,” the treatment of homelessness and housing
deprivation through social housing has reached its limit. Moreover, the “very social”
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provision—temporary accommodation, shelters, hotels, etc.—considered both desirable and
problematic, contributes to the blurring of the right to housing, introducing new norms and
justifying interventions in the private sphere of intimacy. While favouring “deserving” and
“willing-to-be-integrated” persons, the mechanism of assistance is reactivated, empowerment
discouraged, and conditions for an aggravated conflict among the applicants realized.88

B. DESIRES OF RIGHTS IN A CONTEXT OF GROWING
INEQUALITIES: TOWARD A POST-WELFARE SOCIETY?
Welfare society was ruled by a common understanding of equity, of “taking part in” and
“being protected by.”89 At the same time, it was based on a more or less consensual approach
to the distribution of rights and goods to beneficiary groups on a nation-based approach. A
post-welfare regime could be characterized by the individualization of responsibility coupled
with the strengthening of the security net provided by charitable assistance in the context of
liberal governance of the housing market. The paradox of dedicating a huge assistance
budget, on the one hand, and the incapacity to secure housing for all, on the other hand, is
part of “post-welfare governance.” This statement is also based on a historical pattern,90 a
parallel evolution of ideology, urban forms, economic context, social morphology, targeted
groups, and alliances between actors. Ball notes, for instance, that the organization of French
social housing and access to rights includes “bargaining mechanisms” issued from industrial
times, which can be active nowadays even if the tenants’ participation in decision-making is
far from being mainstream: a local arbitration takes place where social landlords and
municipalities dominate (against tenants and state representatives).91
In that interpretative framework, welfare society starts as a national-liberal one, where
collective protections are provided by the state and its partners (private sector and supportive
large nationalized sector) in a context of huge labour immigration, enlarged access to
consumption, urbanization through “new towns,” and the redevelopment of city centres under
the reign of the “modern movement” supported by large social housing estates construction.
As is well known, an economic crisis started at the end of the seventies, putting pressure on
the urban social division of space and on the labour market. Together with these new trends, a
retreat of the social state started to operate, weakening the collective actors (unions) and
favouring the emergence of new partnerships and alliances. With “flexible capitalism”92 and
globalization, new meanings of “the social” have developed: while the welfare state used to
provide almost universal protection and the possibility of upward social mobility, the period
which followed prioritized state aid for “deserving” targeted groups and promoted
capitalization strategies (home ownership among others) for those able to become “selfentrepreneurs” and take personal responsibility for the risk.93 As Robert Castel used to say,
the time after-the-protections has arrived.94
One may consider the DALO as both an effect and an accelerator of the transition
from a welfare regime to a post-welfare one. The progressive implementation of the right to
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housing has been transformed into an enforceable right from 1990 to 2007. The advancement
of a right to housing through the DALO Act has been made possible by an alliance between
global elite groups—including lawyers, politicians, charities, civil society activists—and is
currently fuelled by the approbation of public and private actors in the field of urban
development and housing construction: more housing units, more rights, more responsibility
and, as this is not enough, a large “very social” provision supposed to tackle deep poverty and
exclusion. Of course, it is true that in-need households are re-housed thanks to the DALO. But
instead of reinforcing the position of those more vulnerable generally, one must admit that it
has also created exceptions and exclusions. Increasing competition between territories should
be included in the picture together with fewer margins for state leadership. However, the
system reflects the fundamental ambiguity created by the mismatch between supply and
demand, the indecisive local monitoring of public resources allocation and, finally, the
blurred frontiers circumscribing the right-holders’ groups as local interpretation plays a
crucial role “from ‘compassionate neutrality’ to open hostility,”95 obviously depending on the
local configurations, historical routines, and patterns of interests.

IV. CONCLUSION
The implementation of an enforceable housing right provides considerable potential to
highlight policy responses to the “housing question” (and even more generally the social
question) as formulated in the second decade of the twenty-first century. In this regard, the
French experience reveals a number of challenges and contradictions: on the one hand,
fragmented governance arrangements (or even local irredentism), competing social goals, and
a still-unaffordable, immobilized, or otherwise “filtered” housing supply; on the other hand, a
claim for universal rights and a need to find a (collective) way to deal with a “risk society”96
as inclusively as possible based on local solidarity and networking. The process of
decentralization alongside the drastic diminution of public expenditure at the national level—
and thus subvention to the departments and municipalities—is a kind of squaring the circle as
it puts pressure on the local to handle the problem of housing. In order to be efficient,
housing rights must be strongly promoted, monitored, and supported in each department by
the government’s representatives (the prefects). At the same time, the prefects can hardly
support the delivery of housing to the prioritized households when they have to deal with
reluctant social housing companies or municipalities trying at any cost to avoid the burden of
social expenditures—for example under the form of undocumented families benefiting from
protection due to the presence of children. In Paris, for instance, there is a permanent tension
between the surrounding departments and the inner city of Paris; the municipality accuses the
departments of refusing to share the burden of accommodating poor and often undocumented
families (and the burden of welcoming their children at school) by concentrating those
families in the inner city. For its part, the departments argue that these people are “SAMU
Social 115 families,”97 and that the departments cannot afford the “pouring of Parisian
misery” into their territories because they are already dedicating 90% of the childcare
departmental budgets to subsidize the cost of overnight hotel stays. “The increase in the
number of people to be accommodated thus raised a financial question, and it was up to each
payer, whether the Department or State, to curb expenditure.”98
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In a way, the Paris Opéra hotel tragedy is emblematic of our times: at the time of the
fire, those “temporarily accommodated” people were both rights-holders (as families) and
also, very often, were without rights in the DALO sense as undocumented migrants. Now,
these people are all entitled to a formal right to stay, and they can find a place in the social
housing sector without proceeding through the DALO as a consequence of being victims of
the drama and also thanks to the commitment of housing rights associations. But the Paris
Opéra tragedy continues to highlight legal and policy failures and reveal the real barriers to
realizing a right to housing: as long as these individuals and families can’t access the labour
market, and consequently pay, at least partly, for their own accommodation, they will
continue to suffer the worst forms of social exclusion and exploitation. Because of their
numbers, those most in need of housing will also continue to displace the initial use of hotels
as first-step shelters for isolated homeless persons. At the same time, the story of the Paris
Opéra hotel shows that as soon as families have received a stable legal permit and social
housing in a familiar neighbourhood, they can become independent and dedicate themselves
to the reconstruction of their lives. The decisive importance of being properly housed, on the
basis of which promoters of an enforceable right to housing have legitimated the Law,
appears in all its critical dimensions.
Competition for a position (work) and a place (home) has become the major issue of
current times. Housing policy is today characterized by fragmented governance. Interesting
recommendations emerge from committed experts, exemplifying the need for new ideas:
improving the application process to social housing at different stages of the allocation
process; improving the quality and the effectiveness of responses to applicants; ensuring
transparency and objectivity in the selection of candidates; establishing a mechanism for
access to social housing based on local resources; and promoting an approach to preventing
discrimination99 are the more relevant ones.
Nevertheless, answers in terms of technical improvements may not be sufficient to
strengthen the improbable social cohesion. Recent important housing acts (DALO, 2007;
ALUR, 2014) will reverse the trend of fragmentation only if embedded into a much more
complete understanding of the housing question, that is, an understanding which would
recognize that housing supply has just become too expensive and too selective, and that
homelessness is an extreme expression of new forms of poverty and exclusion.100 All
dimensions of exclusionary processes should then be taken into account, including
immigration policy. At the moment, the treatment of housing deprivation proceeds in two
quite different directions: individual rights consolidation for targeted right-holders, on the one
hand, and tentative attempts to re-politicize the housing question as a matter of common
interest and social security on the other. The first direction distributes protections according
to a selective (juridical) path submitted to possibly divergent appreciations and to unequal
capabilities; the second tends to construct universal (socio-political) norms and attempts to
restore equity and social cohesion. Together, these two directions illustrate the tension
currently active in our post-welfare societies.
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